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In the ideological legacy of Friedrich Engels, the critique of “state socialism” has a 
prominent, if overlooked place. According to this conception, the essence of socialism 
is that the existing state intervenes in the capitalist economy and society with reforms 
to benefit the working class. The first section of this article outlines Engels’ critique of 
state socialism. It mentions how left geographers have approached his remarks on the 
trend, specifically in regard to the housing question, nationalisation, and liberal 
democracy. The second part highlights the contemporary significance of Engels’ 
conception of proletarian emancipation- as contained in his critique of state socialism. 
Engels’ remarks can help clarify the objective conditions for socialism, conditions that 
some left geographers continue to ignore. It brings Engels insights to bear upon the 
Syriza Party in Greece, Corbynism in the UK, Bernie Sanders in the US, and the “pink 




In mid nineteenth century Europe the state began to play an increasingly active role in 
regulating the socio-economic structure of capitalism. The concept of “state socialism” 
emerged as a reflection of this development. According to this conception, “the essence 
of socialism” is that the existing state intervenes in the capitalist economy and society 
with reforms to benefit the working class.1Socialist reformists promoted this ideal in 
their belief that the government could emancipate the workers from above. By contrast, 
the apologists for the bourgeois state supported this ideal in order to maintain 
capitalism. They sought to portray every state effort to regulate economic and social 
relations as “socialism” (Panfilov, 1971: 222). Both of these tendencies conflated 
socialism with one, two, or all of the following government reforms: social policies, 
such as public services and welfare; the provision of “state aid” to establish socialistic 
institutions; and the nationalisation of economic establishments. 
The critical evaluation of state socialism has a prominent place in the ideological 
legacy of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the founders of Marxism. Some 
commentators have identified differences between their views on other subjects.2 They 
will find no such differences in their views on state socialism. The founders maintained 
a frequent correspondence on this concept, and they jointly denounced it as a 
falsification of the bourgeois state, one harmful to the growing working class. It was 
	
1 This nineteenth century conception should not be confused with the modern one, 
which covers any socialist standpoint that advocates the state, either as a temporary 
feature during the transition from capitalism to socialism, or as a defining feature of 
socialism itself. For a geographical analysis of this latter conception, see Saed (2016). 
2 For a recent analysis and rebuttal of the view that Engels departed from Marxism, 
see Mavroudeas (2020). 
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Engels, however, who provided the more comprehensive and detailed analysis of this 
“false socialism”. He continued their joint critique of it after Marx’s death.  
Until his last days Engels tried to show the socialist reformists why state socialism 
contained nothing of the genuine article. As for the bourgeois apologists, he argued that 
it was “nothing but self-interested misrepresentation on the part of the Manchester 
bourgeoisie to describe as ‘socialism’ all interference by the state with free 
competition”. The masses, he observed, were expected to accept this falsification 
uncritically, though the apologists themselves only pretended to believe it (1992a: 74; 
Panfilov, 1971: 222). The term was “simply journalese, a mere cliché from which 
anything or nothing may be inferred” (2004a: 27-28). 
In comparison with his writings on “scientific” and “utopian” socialism, Engels’ 
views on state socialism have received little scholarly attention.3 This is unfortunate. In 
his critique of this phenomenon Engels outlines a conception of proletarian 
emancipation that strikes at the heart of capitalist exploitation. He shows that the 
construction of socialism demands the building of a new state, one that guarantees the 
workers democratic control over their public affairs. Proletarian ownership of the 
means of production is rightly at the core of his vision. Engels demonstrates that state 
socialism cannot realise this goal. Instead of building a new proletarian state, it utilises 
the existing one to enact a few reforms.  Instead of realising workers’ control over their 
economic activities, it grants this control to the exploiting state. That is why Engels 
describes state socialism as “one of the infantile diseases of proletarian socialism” 
(2004b: 276). 
In the course of developing these arguments, this article explores how left 
geographers have engaged with Engels, state socialism, and proletarian emancipation. 
Whilst some endorse Engels’ conception of socialism, others, whilst adopting his 
critique of capitalism, do not. Their solutions therefore fail to overcome exploitation. 
This is an issue in left geography that the present article attempts to highlight, explain, 
and address.  
Part one provides a chronological overview of Engels’ critique of the various forms 
of state socialism, which he developed over four decades. It mentions how geographers 
have interpreted his remarks on the trend, specifically in relation to the “housing 
question”, nationalisation, and liberal democracy. It defends the power and significance 
of Engels’ arguments. 
Part two argues that Engels’ concept of emancipation remains relevant today. His 
remarks on state socialism help to clarify the objective conditions for genuine 
socialism, conditions that some left geographers continue to ignore. Drawing upon 
recent geographical work, it deploys Engels’ insights to critique some contemporary 
adherents of state socialism: the Syriza Party in Greece, Bernie Sanders in the US, 
Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party in the UK, and the “pink tide” in Latin America. The 
article concludes with a summary of the main arguments. 
 
I. Engels’ critique of state socialism 
 
Engels began to scrutinise state socialism early on in his intellectual development. The 
phenomenon came up in his 1847 text Principles of Communism, which served as a 
draft for the Communist Manifesto, published a year later. Here Engels argued that 
socialism would become possible only once the working class seized state power and 
	
3	Hal Draper’s (1990: ch. 3 and 4) detailed commentary on Marx and Engels is a 
notable exception. For a commentary focusing on Engels, see Panfilov (1971).	
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established “a democratic constitution”, one expressing “the direct or indirect 
dominance of the proletariat”. This class had to then use its revolutionary government 
to introduce transitional measures, including social policies like state provided housing. 
The most important transitional step was to gradually wrest the means of production 
from the bourgeoisie, centralise it in state hands, and proceed to organise production in 
accordance with a “definite plan”. This process necessitated the violation of bourgeois 
legality, especially the rights of private property. As such, the workers could not 
achieve socialism by utilising the capitalist state, or by pressurising it to grant 
concessions from above. They had to smash this state, replace it with their own 
revolutionary democracy, and emancipate themselves. Engels did not view the state as 
a permanent feature of socialism, however. With the inception of communism, a 
classless society of material abundance, “the state would cease to be useful and would 
wither away” (Royle, 2020: 16; Engels, 2005).  
     In his Principles Engels outlined the communist attitude towards state socialism- 
though he did not yet use the term- by distinguishing between its “bourgeois” and 
“democratic” variants. The former proposed “mere welfare measures” and “grandiose 
systems of reform which, under the pretence of re-organizing society”, strived to 
preserve capitalism. Communists had to struggle “unremittingly” against this trend. By 
contrast, democratic socialists advocated some communist measures, but only those 
that they thought would abolish the “evil” features of capitalism. “[T]hey tended to see 
the transitional demands mentioned by Engels as sufficient in themselves to end the 
misery of capitalist society” (Royle, 2020: 17). Since democratic socialists tended to be 
either confused proletarians or petty-bourgeois representatives with overlapping 
interests, communists had to cooperate with them as far as their own principles 
permitted, provided that the latter did not ally with the ruling bourgeoisie (Engels, 
2005).  
In the late 1840s Marx and Engels dealt with the French politician Louis Blanc, who 
thought that it was possible to persuade the bourgeois state to introduce “national 
French socialism” from above, and upon the basis of the capitalism. Blanc gave a 
limited role to the working masses in this process. At most, they could only pressurise 
the ruling class to institute socialist reforms themselves. He rejected the idea that the 
masses should take this matter into their own hands (Draper, 1990: 66). The founders 
denounced Blanc as a reformist and “representative of sentimental phrase-socialism”. 
They highlighted his national chauvinism, his glorification of the French bourgeois 
state, and his opposition to proletarian self-emancipation (Marx and Engels, 1978: 537; 
Marx, 1980: 50; Engels, 1976: 398). Their evaluation was vindicated by historical 
events. When, during the 1848 revolution and the 1871 Paris commune, the French 
workers advanced beyond their role as “pressurisers” and strived create their own 
proletarian state, Blanc denounced them, and supported the massacre of the 
revolutionaries by the bourgeois state forces that would supposedly create his socialism 
(Draper, 1990: 66-67). 
In the 1850s Engels targeted the French emperor Napoleon III, who implemented 
social policy reforms for the poor by utilising the finance capital of the joint stock bank 
Credit Mobilier, owned by the Saint-Simonian brothers Emile and Isaac Péreire. 
Publications described his regime as socialist, despite the fact that it signified the 
counter-revolution and a return to conservatism after the failed 1848-49 revolutions 
(Royle, 2020: 19). Besides dissolving the national assembly, the emperor sought to 
provide a lawful and stable environment for capital accumulation. Engels (1983: 68) 
exposed Napoleon’s “socialist inclinations” by pointing out their inevitable 
transformation “into simple bourgeois reforms”.   
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 In the 1860s Marx and Engels struggled against Ferdinand Lassalle, the Prussian 
nationalist reformist who transitioned from a student of Marx into the leading 
philosopher and advocate of state socialism. Lassalle rejected the Marxist conception 
of the state as an instrument of class oppression that “withers away” during the 
transition to communism. He instead viewed this entity as an institution that stood 
above class interests, and as a defender of justice that would be a leading force in 
promulgating socialism. “Lassalle’s tactics…involved trying to win over the 
aristocracy to bestow universal suffrage from above” (Royle, 2020, 23). His socialist 
“state aid” programme envisioned the Prussian state advancing loans to finance the 
establishment of producers’ cooperatives. This could be achieved, he argued, if the 
elected representatives of the workers’ movement formed an alliance with the ruling 
Junker-landowning class (Draper, 1990: 65). 
Engels and Marx (1987: 96) opposed Lassalle’s “ill-starred illusion that a Prussian 
government might intervene with socialist measures”. The Junkers benefitted from the 
oppression of the working class. They had no interest in alleviating their conditions, let 
alone supporting socialism. Whilst the founders thought that historical developments 
would make this obvious, they wanted communists to expose the truth in advance. 
Engels did this on several occasions. In a cooked up review of Capital he exposed the 
bourgeois essence of Lassalle’s “Royal Prussian government socialism”, and severed 
its association with Marx. His message was clear: Marxism repudiated every state aid 
system that attempted to create socialism upon the basis of a reformed capitalist order 
(1985b: 225). 
In 1875 the Social Democratic Workers Party of Germany, to which Marx and 
Engels belonged, merged with the Lassallean General German Workers’ Association 
to form the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDP). The SDP platform- called the 
“Gotha Program”- was sent to Marx and Engels for comment. They both immediately 
recognised that the programme proclaimed “state aid” not merely as a characteristic of 
socialism, but as the essence of socialism itself. It proclaimed, in other words, that 
socialism could exist on the basis of the capitalist system, and without the establishment 
of a proletarian state (Royle, 2020: 34). Engels was having none of it. He insisted that 
the Lassalleans “should, if not wholly relinquish the universal panacea of state aid, at 
least admit it to be a secondary provisional measure alongside and amongst many others 
recognised as possible” (1991a: 60). Whilst his party programme also supported state 
aid, it featured as “one of many transitional measures”, rather than a “unique and 
infallible panacea for all social ills” (1991b: 97).  
In 1872, whilst examining the shortage of affordable housing available to the 
workers in Western Europe’s industrial centres, Engels denounced the “revolutionary” 
solution proposed by the eminent socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. This French 
theorist proposed to end exploitative private landlordism by converting the tenants’ 
rents into purchase payments, so that the workers could own their homes. This solution 
“not only did nothing to challenge the existence of private property rights, but actually 
made those rights even stronger” (Larsen et al, 2016: 581-582). In his articles on The 
Housing Question Engels (1988) denounced Proudhon as a “bourgeois socialist”. He 
denied that home ownership amongst the working class was a socialist measure. Far 
from aiding the workers, it was an essential condition for capitalist expansion. It 
underlined “the stark inequalities, grotesque exploitation, and appalling injustices” that 
Engels had witnessed first hand in Manchester (Larsen et al, 2016: 581-582). The true 
socialist solution to the housing question was not private ownership under a capitalist 
state, but the abolition of capitalism itself. These arguments are not only of historical 
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interest. Left geographers have defended their relevance for the housing question today 
(Larsen et al, 2016: 581-582; Smith, 2016: 679; Hodkinson, 2012: 427).  
From the late 1870s Engels turned his attention towards the apologists of the German 
bourgeois-Junker state, who represented its strengthened economic role as its 
“socialist” transformation. State socialism was widespread during this period. After the 
anti-socialist laws came into force in 1878, it remained “the only ‘socialism’ permitted 
and even promoted by Bismarck’s Prussian government” (Panfilov, 1971: 223). This 
theory was particularly practical for university professors. They could present 
themselves as “socialists” to the workers, whilst simultaneously supporting the Prussian 
monarchy and its chancellor (Draper, 1990: 95-96). Between 1878 and 1882 they 
published their apologetics in the weekly newspaper, Der Staatssozialist, with the 
government’s permission. These academics wanted nothing to do with the labour 
movement. Class struggle and revolution did not fit into their ideology. Instead of 
promoting the self-emancipation of the working class, their socialism was a deliberate 
falsification of the exploiting state.  
When Bismarck nationalised some industrial establishments, some SDP members 
joined the professors in describing these measures as socialist. Marx’s failing health 
prevented him from refuting this opportunism effectively. Engels therefore led the 
charge. He clarified the relationship between nationalisation and socialism in his 
classical work of Marxist theory, Anti-Dühring. 
Under capitalism, Engels explains, the socialised organisation of production in the 
private enterprise contradicts the anarchic laws of production in society. Because of 
this, the developing productive forces pressurise the capitalist class to recognise their 
social character in practical terms. This results, initially, in the growth of joint stock 
companies, monopolies and trusts, that attempt to minimise anarchic competition and 
regulate production. The transition from competition to monopoly gives the bourgeoisie 
huge profits. But since it does not remove the underlying contradiction, the state itself 
must eventually take over production, firstly, in the areas that are essential to the 
functioning of capitalism. But nationalisation by itself is not socialist. It abolishes 
neither the anarchic, exploitative nature of the economic system nor the political 
domination of the bourgeoisie. “The workers remain wage workers-proletarians”. 
Because of this, the state functions as a national capitalist- an instrument serving the 
capitalist class nationally. The more it takes over the productive process, the more wage 
labourers it exploits  (1987b: 265-266; Draper, 1990: 109-110). This argument remains 
relevant today. Geographers such as Harvey (2006: 137) and Demirovic (2006: 137) 
have used it to explain the dynamics of contemporary state monopoly capitalism.  
Engels also denies that nationalisation is necessarily an advance towards socialism: 
 
For only when the means of production and distribution have actually outgrown the 
form of management by joint-stock companies, and when, therefore, the taking them 
over by the state has become economically inevitable, only then—even if it is the 
state of today that effects this—is there an economic advance, the attainment of 
another step preliminary to the taking over of all productive forces by society itself 
(1987b: 265). 
 
Nationalisation may potentially show that the means of production have reached an 
order of magnitude that private owners can no longer cope with, in which case it is a 
step towards socialism. But Engels argues that this was not the case in nineteenth 
century Europe. In every instance it was undertaken not out of economic necessity, but 
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out of the ruling class’ thirst for power. Nationalisation strengthened the bourgeois 
state: 
 
…since Bismarck went in for state-ownership of industrial establishments, a kind of 
spurious socialism has arisen, degenerating, now and again, into something of 
flunkeyism, that without more ado declares all state ownership, even of the 
Bismarckian sort, to be socialistic. Certainly, if the taking over by the state of the 
tobacco industry is socialistic, then Napoleon and Metternich must be numbered 
among the founders of socialism. If the Belgian state, for quite ordinary political and 
financial reasons, itself constructed its chief railway lines; if Bismarck, not under 
any economic compulsion, took over for the state the chief Prussian lines, simply to 
be the better able to have them in hand in case of war, to bring up the railway 
employees as voting cattle for the government, and especially to create for himself 
a new source of income independent of parliamentary votes—this was, in no sense, 
a socialistic measure, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously. 
Otherwise, the Royal Maritime Company, the Royal porcelain manufacture, and 
even the regimental tailor of the army would also be socialistic institutions (1987b: 
265). 
 
Engels does not suggest that nationalisation is unrelated to socialism. He does, 
however, highlight the conditions for this relationship. The class character of the state 
is for him the deciding factor (Draper, 1990: 113). Nationalisation under a bourgeois 
state cannot be socialist, since production is controlled not by society, but by a minority 
in control of the state. But if the working class “seizes political power”, destroys the 
bourgeois state, and establishes its own majority rule, then nationalisation can be a 
socialist measure, one that precedes the democratic organisation of production 
according to a collectively decided plan (1987b: 266-268).  
Bismarck’s nationalisation was not socialist because it was undertaken by a Junker 
state in order to strengthen the exploiting regime. One benefit was a boost in state 
power. The state increased its financial independence from external control, and in 
particular, parliamentary control over taxes, since its railways and tobacco monopoly 
revenues filled the government coffers regardless of the bourgeoisie’s political 
institutions. The regime also gained power by assuming “direct command of two new 
armies, that of railway officials and that of tobacco sellers, and the consequent power 
to confer appointments and engage in corruption”. To add to this, “the state tobacco 
workers would…at once become subject to exceptional [Anti-socialist] laws and, still 
worse, [be] deprived of the liberty to associate or strike” (1991c: 308-09). As Engels 
explained in his article on “The socialism of Mr Bismarck”, “the plan to concentrate all 
the railways in the hand of the Imperial Government has its origin not in the social 
welfare of the country but in the individual welfare of two insolvent banks”. It would 
enrich the shareholders, but not the working class. This showed that the “German 
Empire is just as completely under the yoke of the Stock Exchange as was the French 
Empire in its day. It is the stockbrokers who prepare the projects that the Government 
has to carry out—for the profit of their pockets” (1989: 277, 279). Nor was Bismarck’s 
protective tariff policy socialist. Whilst this intervention was touted as a pro-worker 
measure, it was really a means of exploiting the workers in their capacity as consumers 
(1992b: 260; Draper, 1990: 113-115). These benefits showed why Germany’s “alleged 
socialism” was “nothing but feudal reaction on the one hand and, on the other, a pretext 
for extortion”. With Bismarck it was a “case of money, money and again money”. The 
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chancellor’s pretexts changed in accordance with “purely external considerations” 
(1992a: 74).  
Engels recognised that Bismarck’s programme brought some benefits for socialists. 
Whilst highlighting these, however, he emphasised that they provided no grounds for 
supporting the regime (Draper, 1990: 116). Firstly, the tobacco monopoly would help 
transform the feudalistic conditions in the east Elbian region, where the Junkers 
dominated, and the small-scale industrial establishments would give way to big 
industry, which would be the foundation for future socialist production (1991c, 309). 
Another benefit was that in the long term, the army of workers employed and exploited 
by the state enterprises would join the socialists. But instead of opposing private 
enterprises, the workers would oppose the state that employed them, which would 
represent the primary political and economic oppressor. This was why “Bismarck's 
mania for nationalisation [w]as something we should not endorse but which, like 
everything else”, would turn out “nolens volens [whether they wanted it or not] in our 
favour” (1992f:  127). 
Engels always maintained that German state socialism had little resemblance with 
genuine socialism. A few petty-bourgeois ideologists created the slogan, and they 
wagered that the desperate, ignorant masses would support it in the absence of any 
better alternative. As he expressed it, “a drowning man clutches at any straw, nor can 
he wait for a boat to push off from the bank and come to his rescue. The boat is socialist 
revolution, the straw, protective tariffs and state socialism” (1992c, 153). Engels did 
not blame the workers from grasping this straw. It alleviated their suffering during the 
present, whereas proletarian socialism seemed to them a long way off. He nevertheless 
lamented the dilemma this produced in winning the workers over to Marxism. 
Throughout the 1880s Engels continued to criticise the various pronouncements and 
forms of state socialism. He identified two causes for the increasing popularity of the 
doctrine during this period, one subjective and one objective. The subjective cause was 
the growth of the fighting working class movement, which struggled against its 
exploitation more boldly and fearlessly. Bourgeois ideologists realised that if they were 
to save capitalism, they needed to adopt the language of their class enemy. They needed 
to re-define socialism in a way that could make the existing capitalist state look like a 
socialist paradise. The reformist doctrine of state socialism provided them with 
precisely this flexible model (1995a: 184). The objective cause underlying the growth 
of state socialism was the breakdown of capitalism itself. The growing economic 
contradictions undermined the vulgar political economy of the “old Manchester School 
men” in England and Germany. In an attempt to gloss over these contradictions and 
safeguard the bourgeois order, the ideologists of this school began to advocate 
“socialist” state interference in the economy. The only difference between the state 
socialists in these countries was that the English were, “in true English fashion”, 
“demanding intervention not so much by the State as by the local authorities” (1995b: 
390-91). 
Engels continued to oppose the “apologists of Bismarck's Staats-Sozialismus”, 
people like Max Quarck, who viewed “every crumb of state socialism tossed to them 
by Bismarck” as a sign of socialism (1995c: 141; 1995d: 150; 1995e: 235; 1995f: 348; 
1995g: 385); people like Georg Von Vollmar, who were guilty of “unashamed arse-
crawling” to the Prussian government (2004a: 28); people like Albert Schäffle, who 
had written nothing but “monstrous twaddle” in his writings on socialism (1992e: 57). 
He opposed the spread of state socialist ideas abroad, such as in Italy, under Professor 
Achille Loria (1992d: 449; 1995j: 24-25; 1995k: 226), and in France, under Paul 
Brousse (2001a: 93). 
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Engels paid special attention to Karl Rodbertus, who had turned from a “decent 
chap” into “the apostle of the careerists of Bismackian socialism” for “all those who 
loiter among the state socialist fringes’ of the party”. Engels argued that Robertus’ 
socialist vision was based upon “the Prussian state of that time”.  “As a good Prussian 
he appeals to the state: a decree of the state authority orders the reform” (1990: 285, 
289). Engels found it particularly important to criticise this “prophet of careerist 
socialism” because his ideas were being used to denigrate social democracy and berate 
Marx as its guide to socialist theory. For the socialists who wanted to make 
“sympathetic speeches” in parliament without angering the police, “His Excellency 
Rodbertus” was “a godsend” (1995h: 138-39; 1995i: 188-89; 1995b: 385; 1990: 280). 
In short, Rodbertus wanted to socialise labour on a socialist basis and at the same time, 
by employing the Prussian bureaucratic state, retain the capitalist system of wage labour 
and exploitation. Engels pointed out that his socialism “refers the whole matter to the 
decision of the bureaucracy, which determines from above the share of the worker in 
his own product and graciously permits him to have it”. Engels emphasised the 
necessity of solving socialist tasks “in the usual democratic way”, with elected and 
accountable officials, not bureaucrats. In his view, socialism demanded the mass 
participation of the toilers. The state had to extend democracy into every sphere of 
organisation. This was no utopian dream, but a practical necessity, an objective 
condition for building communism. Only democracy could ensure the rule of the 
working class (1990: 289; Panfilov, 1971: 229-230). There is therefore no basis for the 
view, promoted by anarchist geographer Simon Springer (2014: 261), that Engels was 
committed to “authoritarianism”. 
In the early 1890s, his final years, Engels criticised the “Petty-bourgeois socialists” 
in France, Germany, Switzerland and New Zealand for presenting the establishment of 
a state monopoly on grain imports as a socialist reform. In all of these countries he 
argued that this protectionist measure was actually implemented in the interests of the 
landowning classes (2004b: 275; 2004c: 291).   
Engels also repudiated those who thought that liberal democracy could emancipate 
the workers. When the French reformists became enamoured with this “republican state 
socialism”, he called attention to their error. Engels reminded them that a democratic 
republic could never be socialist so long as it assumed the institutional form of liberal 
democracy. By design, this ensured the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. The workers 
needed to smash this republic and establish their own proletarian democratic state, such 
as the one established by the 1871 Paris Commune (Royle, 2020: 32-33). Until then, 
the workers could “wring concessions” from the republic, but they could not expect it 
to solve socialist tasks (2004b: 276). Indeed, these remarks remain insightful today. 
Marxist geographers like Harvey (2001: 275-276) have found them helpful in 
understanding and approaching contemporary liberal democracy.  
From the beginning to the end of his revolutionary career Engels took an 
uncompromising stance on state socialism. He viewed neither social policy reforms, 
nor state aid, nor nationalisation by a capitalist state, as synonymous with socialism. 
He rejected the reformist notion that socialism could arise upon the bourgeois economic 
system. Engels argued that the socialist credentials of a socio-economic system depend 
upon the class character of the state. Socialism can emerge only when the working class 
seizes state power and establishes its hegemony. The fundamental condition for 
completing this process is the abolition of the bourgeois state as an instrument of 
minority rule, and its replacement with a workers state that enables genuine majority 
rule, via the direct participation of the masses in all spheres of society. Only then can 
	 9	
social policy reforms, state aid, and nationalisation be characterised as socialist 
measures.  
Engels was right. If it were only necessary for the state to intervene in economic and 
social relations, then some of the most oppressive capitalist regimes could be portrayed 
as bastions of socialism. If the working masses conflate the characteristics of state 
socialism with the real thing, then they might relinquish the struggle to abolish their 
exploitation and overthrow the bourgeois order, which is precisely what the state 
socialists wanted. Engels’ criticism of this opportunist tendency was therefore of the 
utmost importance in the socialist struggle. 
 
II. The relevance of Engels’ conception of emancipation today 
 
Engels’ conception of emancipation- as outlined in his critique of state socialism- 
remains relevant to left geographers today, because their solutions to capitalist 
exploitation are varied. Some, like Harvey, have followed Engels in conceptualising 
proletarian emancipation as workers’ ownership of the means of production. Others, 
whilst adopting Engels’ critique of capitalism, have proposed reformist solutions that 
fail to address exploitation. This failure can be illustrated by surveying some recent left 
geography studies on the interrelated topics of nature, labour, housing, the commons, 
resources, and precarity. 
In his critical survey of the nature literature, Leahy shows that “radical reformist” 
geographers, whilst critiquing the environmental degradation of capitalism, “never 
directly propose the institution of social ownership of the means of production”. At 
most, they advocate “stronger government intervention” in the economy and “de facto 
nationalisation” without socialisation. Rather than place the economy in the workers’ 
hands, they hope that the promotion of “ethical investment will transform capitalist 
behaviour”, creating a situation where all private investors will “consider 
environmental and social criteria when making decisions” (Leahy, 2018: 7, 4). 
With regards to labour issues, Brydges and Hanlon recently examined the fashion 
industry’s treatment of garment workers in light of the Covid-19 outbreak. Whilst 
identifying this industry as “one of the most exploitative and inequitable industries in 
the world”, they do not propose workers ownership as a solution. They instead suggest 
that “fashion brands must expand their understanding of ‘community’ and seek out 
shared-responsibility approaches which acknowledge interconnections across their 
global supply chains” (Brydges and Hanlon, 2020: 196-97). In other words, they expect 
the monopolies to reform their practices through moral appeals. 
Maalsen, Rogers and Ross recently examined the shortage of affordable housing in 
Australia, made worse by the Covid-19 pandemic. Whilst quoting Engels’ view that 
there are already enough houses to remedy the shortage, they reject his socialist 
solution. They instead hope that, in response to popular pressure, the Australian 
government will “create a new and more socially just housing system”, by 
“intervening” with a “proposed housing building stimulus program that might 
counteract a disaster capitalism”. At the same time as proposing this reformist solution, 
the authors acknowledge that “the government is likely to revert back to their old 
housing habits post-pandemic” (Maalsen, Rogers and Ross, 2020: 227-28). 
Left geographers have criticised capitalisms’ tendency to enclose, privatise and 
commodify resources previously shared and controlled by the people collectively, 
otherwise known as “commons”. In order to combat this enclosure, left geographers 
have endorsed “commoning”, the practice of reclaiming these spaces and resources for 
the public. According to Turner (2016: 4), however, some geographers fail to recognise 
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that “the proliferation of commons-like institutions is not necessarily anti-capitalist but 
actually can be seen as an attempt to sustain the functioning of capitalism”. Likewise, 
Chatterton argues that some geographers offer vague conceptions of what kind of 
“transitions” the various forms of commons provide. “It is difficult to get a sense of 
whether transitions point towards reformist, escapist, ruptural or revolutionary 
outcomes”. Although, within the geographical literature on the commons, there is often 
“critical, perhaps even anti-capitalist, analysis bubbling just under the surface and 
struggling to get out…there remains a reluctance to name and advocate for the more 
radical nature of transitions” that socialism demands (Chatterton, 2016: 1). 
With regards to resources, Pederson uses “critical development theory” to examine 
the impact of Canadian mining corporations in Guatemala. These corporations, he 
argues, have failed to consider the “concerns, lives and livelihoods” of the local 
communities. Although Pederson highlights the capitalist essence of this exploitative 
resource extractivism, his solution does not involve Guatemalans themselves 
establishing ownership and control over their resources. He instead encourages 
Canadians to divest their assets from the mining companies, which will send a warning 
“message to corporation and the governments alike: if companies do not respect local 
populations and their environments and treat them with dignity, then leave the minerals 
in the ground” (Pederson, 2014: 204-205). In other words, Pederson endorses 
benevolent capitalist exploitation, not the end of capitalism full stop. 
In her recent analysis of precarity, Lawreniuk examined how Covid-19 produced “a 
crisis in global supply chains” by triggering a fall in labour demand and rising 
unemployment. This crisis highlighted, though it did not create, the “hyper-precarity” 
of workers in global capitalist industry. Lawreniuk argues that this situation “requires 
corrective action. To be ignorant is no longer an excuse; to be indifferent is to be 
complicit”. However, she stops short of outlining workers’ control as the solution to 
precarity. Lawreniuk (2020: 4) instead concludes, rather vaguely, that “global industry 
must be transformed to ensure that workers are not put to die for profit”. The cardinal 
issue of who should control the means of production is un-clarified. 
Why do some left geographers, who identify private ownership as a root cause of 
exploitation, shy away from advocating workers’ ownership as a solution? This is a 
difficult question to answer. Some may be wary of the negative stigma surrounding the 
term “socialism”, particularly in academia. Others may subscribe to “capitalist 
realism”, the doctrine that there is no viable alternative to capitalism, no matter how 
exploitative it is. Others yet may associate socialism with the Marxist-Leninist 
countries, which are widely denounced for their alleged exploitative practices.  
Whatever the reason, the tendency of some left geographers to advocate reformism 
over socialism does not aid the struggle for proletarian emancipation. It actually harms 
this struggle, because the theory and practice of state socialism has become widespread. 
During the rise of twentieth century imperialism this reformist concept became a 
popular “tool of the apologists of state monopoly capitalism” (Panfilov, 1971: 224). As 
Bolshevik leader V. I. Lenin observed in 1917, “the erroneous bourgeois reformist 
assertion that…state monopoly capitalism is no longer capitalism, but can now be 
called ‘state socialism’… is very common”. Like Engels before him Lenin rejected this 
falsification. No matter how much the state monopolies try to plan, regulate the 
economy, and calculate in advance the volume of production on a national or 
international scale, the world remained “under capitalism—at its new stage, it is true, 
but still capitalism, without a doubt” (Lenin, 1977a: 447- 448). The only thing this 
increased state intervention proves is that capitalism had become moribund, and that it 
is ready for the “next step”, the transition to socialism. In agreement with Engels, Lenin 
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emphasised that this step requires the seizure of state power by the working class 
(Lenin, 1977b: 362). 
Today, in the twenty-first century, the concept of state socialism has achieved 
ideological hegemony in much of the world. Geographical studies have made this clear 
(Smith, 2005: 10; Radice, 2010: 27). Although the term itself has long fallen into disuse, 
mainstream definitions of socialism typically mean state socialism. The geographical 
literature identifies the 2007-2008 global financial crisis as the most recent a landmark 
event in this definitional shift (Panayotakis, 2010; Swyngedouw, 2010). In order to 
keep capitalism afloat western governments granted huge economic bailouts, whilst 
also nationalizing several banks. Ordinary taxpayers were made to foot much of the 
bill. In response to these state interventions, “a large number of mainstream and 
progressive journalists, politicians, and economists” described the bailouts as 
“socialist”. On the one hand, capitalism was defined as “purely” free markets, whilst 
on the other hand, many encouraged “the interpretation of government intervention in 
the economy as socialism”. The latter “definition represents a true ideological coup for 
defenders of capitalism”. This is so because the boom and bust cycles endemic to 
capitalism can be presented as alternating modes of production. The periods of 
economic prosperity, characterized by no state intervention, can be described as 
“capitalist”, whilst the subsequent periods of economic decline, characterized state 
intervention, can be falsely described as “socialist”. By defining the state’s unpopular 
corporate “bailouts as socialism”, ideologists of all stripes succeeded in “framing the 
painful consequences of capitalist crisis as a failure of socialism” (Panayotakis, 2010: 
4, 5-6, 15). Swyngedouw (2010: 298) suggests that if this falsification is taken 
“seriously”, “the choice we are presented with today is no longer the one Marx once 
held up, i.e. between barbarism and socialism, but rather between socialism and 
communism”. 
One reason for the success of this conceptual reshuffle is that the doctrine of state 
socialism remains popular amongst the adherents of “democratic socialism”, who have 
been influential in promoting it (Panayotakis, 2010: 11). Although they deny the fact, 
many of them promote a utopia that it is basically identical to the one conceived by the 
reformists and bourgeois apologists of the nineteenth century, a conception that Engels 
characterised as capitalist. This section focuses his critical insights upon the more 
prominent democratic socialist currents identified by geographers in recent years: 
Syriza in Greece, Bernie Sanders in the US, Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party in the UK, 
and the “pink tide” governments in Latin America (Kallis 2019: 14).4 All of the above 
have voiced their support for the Socialist International, whose general “goal”, 





In Greece, the Syriza Party governed from mid 2015 to July 2019. Although this 
organisation was a coalition of left wing and radical parties, it presented itself as 
socialist, and its leader, Alexis Tsipras, described himself as a democratic socialist. 
	
4  Several other geographical studies of state socialism could be explored. Ahmed 
(2011), for instance, exposes India’s “imaginary” constitutional commitment to 
socialism, by showing that the country has become part of the neoliberal order. Eriksen 
(2019: 13) presents the Seychelles as “an intriguing mixture of state socialism and 
globalized capitalism”. 
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Syriza promised to end the neo-liberal austerity policies imposed upon Greece by the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the European Union, collectively 
known as the “Troika” (Agnantopoulos and Lambrini, 2015: 7). These policies had 
weakened the working class and strengthened the bourgeoisie.  
After coming to power, however, Syriza prostrated itself before the Troika’s 
demands. In return for a bailout loan to save its capitalist economy, it accepted the 
imposition of neoliberal austerity measures that were more severe than before, 
including pension cuts, public spending cuts, the recapitalisation of the banks, mass 
privatisation, and anti-worker legislation, including restrictions on the right to strike. 
Konstantinidis and Vlachou (2017: 10; 2018) offer a detailed geographical analysis of 
these reactionary reformist policies. 
Lapavitsas (2016) dispels the “urban myth” that Syriza’s hand was forced by 
conservative politicians and EU officials, the “monsters of neoliberalism and 
privilege”. The truth is that Syriza wanted an austerity package from the beginning, 
albeit one that they negotiated. Syriza never sought to establish a proletarian state. Its 
“socialist” strategy was to stay within the neo-liberal Eurozone and enforce welfare 
reforms and wage increases. In the end, Syriza’s failure to empower the working class 
fuelled the rise of fascism in Greece, the discrediting of socialist ideas amongst the 
Greek working class, as well as Syriza’s defeat by the liberal-conservative New 
Democracy Party in the 2019 July elections.  
Engels anticipated Syriza’s opportunism in the 1860s, when he argued that state 
socialists liked to made deals with the oppressors and exploiters behind the workers’ 
backs. When Lassalle tried to ally with the Junkers to aid the workers, Engels (1985a: 
478) announced, without an ounce of hyperbole, that the reformist was “operating 
purely in the service of Bismarck”, irrespective of his intentions. This was true. Lassalle 
secretly tried to ally with the chancellor against the bourgeoisie (Royle, 2020: 23). 
Engels later argued that it was “despicable” for the Lassalleans to ignore the “brutal 
patriarchal exploitation of the rural proletariat by the big feudal aristocracy”, out of 
their hope of forming an alliance with the landowners (1987a: 77). Engels’ criticism of 




In the USA, socialism has supposedly risen in popularity largely due to senator Bernie 
Sanders, another self-styled democratic socialist. The contributors to Jacobin (2020), 
an American socialist magazine, have been especially vocal in pushing this narrative. 
They credit Sanders with making socialism mainstream again in the country. Thanks to 
him, it is supposedly less of a dirty word. Americans can describe themselves as 
socialists without being denounced as Stalinists.  
But what does socialism mean to Sanders? In figuring this out, it is wise to quote the 
man himself. In June 2019 he gave a speech that several Jacobin writers praised as a 
landmark treatise on democratic socialism (Taylor, 2019; Day, 2019). In this speech, 
Sanders defined socialism as a list of “economic rights”, including “the right to quality 
health care, the right to as much education as one needs to succeed in our society, the 
right to a good job that pays a living wage, the right to affordable housing, the right to 
a secure retirement, and the right to live in a clean environment”. Sanders presented 
this vision as the “completion” of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal” reforms, which 
included “initiatives like Social Security, unemployment compensation, the right to 
form a union, the minimum wage, protection for farmers, regulation of Wall Street and 
massive infrastructure improvements” (Sanders in Golshan, 2019). Sanders is a state 
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socialist. He wants to win an election and then use the liberal democratic state to 
provide a social safety net for the workers. As his senior policy advisor Heather 
Gautney (2020) wrote in Jacobin, “‘Democratic socialism’ in Sanders’s telling, is made 
up of a series of policy proposals to eradicate poverty, rebuild the working class, 
reinvest in public institutions, and achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth”. He 
has no intention of creating a proletarian state or even establishing public ownership of 
the means of production.  
Sanders has also referred to the “Nordic model” countries as templates for his 
democratic socialism (Schatz, 2020). These countries are not socialist, however. In 
2013 Danish Prime Minister Lars Rasmussen rejected the notion, spread by Sanders 
and his ilk, that the Nordic model is “some sort of socialism”. He rightly said that 
“Denmark is far from a socialist planned economy. Denmark is a market economy”. In 
Rasmussen's view, “the Nordic model is an expanded welfare state which provides a 
high level of security to its citizens, but it is also a successful market economy” (cited 
in Yglesias, 2015). Sanders wants this system for the USA. His platform calls for higher 
taxes and more social welfare spending, but not widespread nationalization or 
democratisation, let alone socialisation.  
It was Engels who showed that the expansion of welfare under a capitalist state is 
not socialism. In Bismarckian Germany he argued that this reform sought to convert 
“as many proletarians as possible into officials and pensioners dependant on the state, 
and to organise, alongside the disciplined army of officials and military, a similar army 
of workers” (1992a: 74). Although Sanders may not recognise it, the welfare state today 
performs the same function. By bribing and controlling the masses, this institution is 
an indispensible tool for maintaining capitalism. The safety net it provides functions as 
a pressure valve that stunts the revolutionary consciousness of the working class. By 
keeping their living conditions just about bearable, it quickly douses any thoughts of 
revolution, even amongst those subsisting in squalor at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy. In the western countries especially, the welfare state strives to keep the 
proletariat in a condition of happy, voluntary, and passive servility to the state of 
monopoly capital. It may lessen absolute poverty, but as David Harvey (2014: 165) 
argues, it has always been “far from…socialist”. 
Engels also rejected the conflation of social policy reforms with socialism. When 
the press presented Louis Napoleon’s reforms as socialist, he wrote that it was “[t]he 
same old story: postal reform=socialism! Conversion of bonds=socialism! FREE 
TRADE=socialism!” (1983: 68). And today, too, Sanders and his supporters 
shamelessly portray reforms that strengthen American state monopoly capitalism as 
socialist, or at any rate, incipient socialism. To take some examples, in 2019 Sanders 
(in Golshan, 2019) described as “socialist” Roosevelt’s “new deal” reforms, as well as 
the US government’s bail out of the banks during the 2008 financial crash. In March 
2020 Sanders’ press secretary described as “socialist” the governments “stimulus 
package”, which aimed to stabilise the economy during the Covid-19 “Coronavirus” 
pandemic (Scher, 2020). The labelling of these temporary government reforms as 
“socialist” policies, despite the fact that they sought to maintain capitalism, is state 




In the UK, Jeremy Corbyn- another self-described democratic socialist- has been 
praised for the same reasons as Sanders. After assuming leadership over the Labour 
Party in 2015, he supposedly revitalised socialism as a positive aim (Panitch and Leys, 
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2020: 21). His predecessors did much to discredit this concept. Under Tony Blair’s 
leadership the Party came to associate socialism with a welfarist capitalism. Blair 
established the philosophical basis for this “New Labour” vision in his pamphlet 
Socialism, written for the reformist Fabian society. Here he rejects Marxism in favour 
of “ethical socialism”, which he defines as “set of values or beliefs” to be instituted by 
the capitalist state (Blair, 1994: 2). Amongst other things, Blair got the party to abandon 
clause 4, which had committed it establish public ownership of the means of 
production. His deformation of socialism was so severe that Margaret Thatcher, one of 
Britain’s most staunch neoliberal conservative leaders, described Blair as her greatest 
achievement. 
In his struggle to lead the Labour Party Corbyn claimed that he would bring 
democratic socialism back on the agenda. Once he got hold of the organisation, 
however, his state socialism shone through, as he tried to achieve his reformist utopia 
via the parliamentary road. 
Corbyn (cited in Panitch and Leys, 2020: 576-77) described Labour’s 2017 election 
manifesto as “the programme of a modern progressive socialist party that has 
rediscovered its roots and purpose”. It proposed to end healthcare privatisation, abolish 
higher education tuition fees, restore union and workers’ rights, and renationalise public 
utilities and railways. It sought the establishment of “an economy that works for all” 
through the use of public procurement and national and regional investment banks. It 
called for laws that would make finance and industry more responsible to the needs of 
workers, consumers, and communities (Panitch and Leys, 2020: 524-25).  
As Panitch and Leys point out, however, the manifesto neglected the cardinal issue 
of establishing a proletarian democratic state, the condition that Engels emphasised 
above all else. There was no proposal to introduce a written constitution, democratise 
the electoral system, or abolish the forms of “unaccountable executive power”. It 
neglected the importance of “ending the corporate capture of the state- the 
rampant…unregulated lobbying, the ‘revolving door’ between the civil service and 
leading business enterprises, or the ‘executive boards’ set up for each government 
department”, which were “filled with private sector personnel”. Furthermore, “there 
was no proposal to end government reliance on corporate management consultancies, 
or to deal with undemocratic nature of BBC”, an officially “neutral” news agency that 
was in reality “a key component of the capitalist state”. Finally, “there was no 
suggestion of ending subsidies to the private schools through which the rich constantly 
renew their dominant positions in the state and corporate elites” (Panitch and Leys, 
2020: 529-530). The programme was state-socialist. 
Even if Labour had won the election, its reforms would have faced “resistance from 
capital, from both domestic and multi-national corporations”. The UK economy 
depended upon global trade, particularly finance. There was no guarantee that 
corporations would continue to invest under a Corbyn government, in which case the 
economy would face collapse (Panitch and Leys, 2020: 545). 
In 2018 Corbyn’s lieutenant John McDonnell promised that democratisation was a 
goal, but he offered no “strategic proposals for changing state apparatuses… beyond 
his determination… to ‘reprogram’ the treasury” and Bank of England. “These plans 
were still far from anything that might be called a socialist strategy for structural 
change”. The models it offered for a socialist economy included “such 
uncompromisingly capitalist regimes as Singapore, South Korea, Japan- and most of 
all, the United States”. Labour was silent on how promoting “internationally 
competitive export enterprises within the framework of global capitalism relates to the 
development of a transformational socialist strategy”. McDonnell also said nothing 
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publicly about introducing investment planning or “controls over the movement of 
capital”, probably because he did not want to jeopardise the “financial sector’s foreign 
exchange earnings”. However, such controls would be crucial if companies refused to 
invest in a socialist run country; and their introduction presupposed “the state’s capacity 
to transform financial services, Britain’s dominant economic sector, into a public 
utility”. The manifesto gave no intention to do this (Panitch and Leys, 2020: 547-550). 
Panitch and Leys (2020: 620) describe Corbyn’s Labour’s 2019 election manifesto 
as an “ambitious programme of democratic-socialist measures, unmatched anywhere 
since the 1970s”. It outlined an expanded smorgasbord of social policy reforms, welfare 
expansions, and sops for the workers. Of all the proposals, its nationalisation measures 
were the most frequently celebrated. This should be unsurprising, for since Labour 
introduced clause 4 the conflation of nationalisation with socialism has become 
something of a fetish amongst leftists in the Party. Engels dealt with this tendency in 
the name of Peter Singer, who regarded “the nationalisation of anything as a semi-, or 
at all events pre-, socialist measure”, and who was therefore a devotee of Bismarck’s 
“protective tariffs, tobacco monopoly, nationalised railways, etc.”. Engels described 
Singer’s conjectures as “prevarications”, and that because they “facilitate debate in a 
middle-class…environment, enjoy a considerable following particularly among those 
bourgeois and academic elements who have come over to us” (1992: 260). In opposition 
to these views he argued that “so long as the propertied classes remain at the helm, 
nationalisation never abolishes exploitation but merely changes its form” (2001b: 152). 
The 2019 manifesto failed to realise this, and it also faced the same issues as the 2017 
version. By attempting to strengthen British liberal democracy and the state of 
monopoly capital, Corbyn’s socialist project was never going to build a workers’ state.  
 
The “pink tide” 
 
State socialism has established deep roots in Latin America. Here the doctrine called 
“Socialism of the 21st century” has been promoted by the leaders of the “Pink Tide” 
governments, including Hugo Chávez (1998-2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013-present) 
in Venezuela, Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) in Argentina, Rafael Correa (2007-2017) 
in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006-2019) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-
2010) in Brazil (Gudynas, 2019: 3). In response to the neoliberal programmes imposed 
upon their countries by the Structural Adjustment Loans during the 1990s, these leaders 
led democratic socialist movements that sought to emancipate the exploited masses.  
These men voiced their opposition to Soviet style communism on the one hand, and 
capitalism on the other. As the following geographical studies show, however, none of 
them established a proletarian state. They all won elections within the existing corrupt, 
authoritarian, bureaucratic state apparatuses, and then attempted to utilise them. 
Socialism of the 21st century consisted of reforms introduced from above, by the 
capitalist state. Although these varied across time and borders, the key policies were 
state socialist: the provision of public services, state aid to establish workers’ 
cooperatives, wealth re-distribution, expansions to the welfare state, and the 
establishment of a mixed economy. Although these measures did much to ease the 
oppression of the workers, no pink tide government overcame capitalism.5 As Robinson 
explains in a recent article in Human Geography, “Leftist rhetoric aside, the Pink Tide 
governments based their strategy on a vast expansion of raw material production in 
	
5 Yates and Bakker (2013) provide a general overview of the capitalist characteristics 
of Latin-American 21st century socialism. 
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partnership with foreign and local contingents of the transnational capitalist class”. This 
strategy has led to some of them being overturned by right wing, pro-capitalist forces 
(Robinson, 2020: 2).  
The Venezuelan case is illustrative. “Chávez’s call for a 21st-century socialism 
sparked hopes that the region could point the way toward an alternative to global 
capitalism” (Robinson, 2020: 2). Two years into the reign of his successor Maduro, a 
geographical study even proclaimed that Chavez’ Venezuela was “the first country in 
the world to make ecosocialism an official government policy” (Schwartzmann and 
Saul 2015: 18). In practice, however, this entailed the imposition of reforms using the 
existing capitalist state. “Four things characterized [Chávez’s] Bolivarian socialism in 
particular: a re-regulation of key markets; a prioritization of social spending; an 
aggressive de-commodification of basic needs; and the construction of a mixed 
economy”. As Cederlöf and Kingsbury argue, “this new ‘socialist’ economy retained 
private property, wages, and crucially, the [nation’s] integration into globalized circuits 
of capital accumulation” (Cederlöf and Kingsbury, 2019: 127). A key “Chavismo” 
policy was the state’s establishment of worker-owned cooperatives, which basically 
revitalised the Lassallean “state-aid” program condemned by Engels. Since these 
cooperatives functioned within a capitalist economy, dominated by anarchic market 
laws, they generated profits for the Venezuelan state of monopoly capital. Engels 
revealed the capitalist nature of this “socialist” cooperative system as early as 1884:  
 
If you want to study a model of state socialism, then take a look at Java. There the 
Dutch government has, on the basis of the old, communist village communities, 
organised production as a whole along such nicely socialist lines, and so neatly 
assumed control of the sale of all produce that…there remains each year a net profit 
of some 70 million marks…Bismarck is a mere child by comparison! (1995l: 82-
83). 
 
Chávez also introduced elements of participatory democracy, in the form of “communal 
councils”, where citizens could determine how to spend government funds in their local 
area. In 2009 Marcano (2009, 76) described these as “the most tangible” expression “of 
Socialism of the twentieth first century in practice”. Alongside these councils, however, 
Chávez retained liberal democracy, with its corrupt bureaucratic apparatus, and much 
of the economy remained under private control. This allowed the capitalists to flourish 
and undermine efforts to empower the workers. As a result of this, the country is now 
in economic ruin under Maduro’s administration, and on the brink of a right-wing 
takeover. Venezuela’s state socialism did not emancipate the working class. “This was 
a socialism that did not come after capitalism…but developed spatially and temporally 
within it while prioritizing values and subject positions outside the market consensus” 
(Cederlöf and Kingsbury, 2019: 132). 
Rodriguez Fernandez (2020), Andreucci (2017: 175), Kohl and Farthing (2012: 233) 
offer the same evaluation of Morales’ attempt to construct what he called an “Andean 
socialist” economy in Bolivia. They show that his regime expanded its “reliance on 
transnational capital” at the expense of the indigenous communities he claimed to serve. 
In Ecuador, “Correa joined Chávez and Morales in articulating the Ecuadorian 
project in the more radical discourse of “21st century socialism”, which promised not 
only to overcome neoliberalism, but to challenge the very structures of global 
capitalism itself”. Amongst other things, Correa’s regime constructed “Millennium 
Cities” for the indigenous communities “with revenues from petroleum extracted from 
their territories” (Wilson and Bayon, 2017a: 2). Wilson and Bayon reject Correa’s 
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attempt to present these cities as “symbols of the ‘Citizens’ Revolution’” and “21st 
century socialism”. They show that these cities actually represent “the predominance 
of ground rent in South American capitalism”. Correa’s socialist rhetoric concealed 
“the violent repression of an autonomous indigenous project of petroleum-based 
modernization”. As such, “the original accumulation of 21st century socialism can…be 
interpreted as a ‘fantasy of origins’, which functions to reproduce the primitive 
accumulation of capital” (Wilson and Bayon, 2017a: 1; 2017b; Wilson, 2017; Stolle-
McAllister 2015: 2-3, 6-7, 15-16). 
De Souza (2020) offers a similar critique of Silva’s democratic socialist 
administration in Brazil. “From the outset”, he argues, “the Lula da Silva government 
(2003–2010) seemed to be more willing to make concessions to agribusiness, mining 
companies and other capitalist interests than to consistently defend the interests of 
subaltern groups”. 
In Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega declared his commitment to democratic 
socialism from the mid-2000s onwards. Like the pink tide leaders, he advocated a range 
of redistributive measures, public services, and forms of direct citizen participation. “In 
practice, however, neoliberal policies exist alongside of, and detract from, social 
programs”. Between 2009 and 2011, for instance, government spending on public 
health decreased, whilst it’s spending on private heath suppliers increased. The 
neighbourhood participatory councils were also corrupt and run by Ortega’s supporters. 
Contrary to their stated purpose, they did not foster meaningful mass political 
engagement. Socialist principles in Nicaragua have slipped “into liberal 
assimilationism”, whilst “neoliberal dynamics sustain inequality” (Ettlinger and 
Hartman, 2015: 42-43). 
Like their nineteenth century predecessors, modern state socialists stumble when 
they approach the cardinal question of consolidating working class power. This step is 
the last rung on the ladder from state monopoly capitalism to socialism. But for that 
reason it is also the most important. It requires the destruction of the capitalist state and 
its replacement by a proletarian one. To be sure, extensive social policy, state aid, and 
nationalisation programmes can help to ease class oppression. But the easing of 
oppression is not emancipation, and the tendency to describe these policies and 
democratic socialist governments as “socialist” has only harmed the concept. In the 
words of David Harvey (2014: xii), “democratic socialism has been discredited”. 





This article has argued that Engels’ critique of state socialism remains significant today, 
over 200 years after his birth, because it elucidates the objective conditions for 
proletarian emancipation, conditions that some left geographers continue to ignore. It 
began by examining Engels’ engagement with this reformist tendency. He repudiated 
the attempt to conflate socialism with social policy and welfare reforms, in the manner 
of Louis Blanc and Napoleon III. He rejected Lassalle’s hope that the Prussian Junker 
state would inaugurate socialism from above, by providing “state aid” to fund socialist 
enterprises. He denigrated Proudhon’s portrayal of private home ownership as a 
socialist solution to the housing question. He ridiculed the presentation of Bismarck’s 
nationalisations as socialist. He repudiated the notion that liberal democracy could 
emancipate the workers. Engels argued that Marxists should support state interventions 
in so far as they alleviated class oppression. But he warned against the erroneous 
	 18	
conflation of these interventions with socialism itself, even if they occurred under 
liberal democracy. Engels emphasised that the working class had to establish its own 
state, one that guaranteed them democratic control over the means of production. 
The second part of the article highlighted the contemporary relevance of Engels’ 
conception of proletarian emancipation, by examining some recent forms of state 
socialism. In Greece, the Syriza Party was elected for its promise to end austerity and 
empower the workers. Once in power, however, it decided that “democratic socialism” 
could best be achieved by making a deal with the Troika and ramping up the state’s 
austerity measures. Engels showed that Lassalle tried to form a similar alliance with 
Bismarck behind the workers backs in the 1860s. In the USA, Sanders dressed up his 
welfare reforms as socialism, even though they sought to recreate the capitalist Nordic 
Model and Roosevelt’s New Deal. Engels showed that welfare by itself does not 
empower the workers, and that its main effect is to increase their dependency upon the 
capitalist state. In the UK, Corbyn’s Labour Party proposed an array of nationalisations 
in its 2017 and 2019 manifestos, though the party neglected the issue of economic 
democratisation. Engels showed that nationalisation without workers’ control does 
nothing to undermine capitalist exploitation. In Latin America, the various pink tide 
governments hoped to inaugurate “Socialism of the 21st Century” by exploiting their 
natural resources. In practice, geographers have shown that this strategy was imposed 
from above, by the existing corrupt, bureaucratic capitalist state. Engels denounced this 
approach in his critique of state socialism in Java. The toiling masses were not 
emancipated in these countries. 
State socialism is alive and well today. It will not disappear any time soon. This 
makes it important to identify the real conditions for proletarian emancipation. 
Although some left geographers have highlighted these conditions, others, for various 
reasons, have failed to do so. That is why anti-capitalist geographers should draw even 
more upon the intellectual armoury of Friedrich Engels, an uncompromising fighter for 
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